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Abstract
Firing costs are often blamed for unemployment.  This paper investigates this
well spread belief.  The main points are two.  First, firing costs are modelled in
an efficiency wage model to capture their effects on employment through wages.
 Secondly, dismissal conflicts are modelled explicitly.  In the context of
imperfectly observable effort, a double moral hazard problem can arise and in
turn firing costs reduced employment because they increase the rent to be paid
to workers.  The determinants of the double moral hazard problem such as the
imprecise definition of dismissal causes are analysed.  The main policy
conclusion is that focus should move onto the clarification of the different
causes of dismissal to minimise the room of interpretation.  If so, then high
enough severance payments in case of “unfair” dismissals can actually have a
punishment role and prevent the double moral hazard problem.
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1 Introduction
Firing costs are oftenblamedfor unemployment inEurope (see OECD (1995), for instance).
The aim of this paper is to investigate this widespread belief from a theoretical point of
view. The model we build makes two main points. First, …ring costs are introduced in
an e¢ciency wage model to capture their e¤ects on employment through wages. Second,
dismissal con‡icts are modeled explicitly and their cost is derived. In particular, two types
of dismissals are considered, redundancies and disciplinary dismissals, where employers and
employees have con‡icting interests1.
Despite the prevalent idea of the (negative) e¤ect of …ring costs on employment, spe-
cially among policy makers and employers, there are very di¤erent views among economists
depending on the model used. For instance, according to the insider-outsider theory put
forward by Lindbeck and Snower (1988), …ring costs are a source of market power for
incumbent workers (the insiders) vis-a-vis the unemployed (the outsiders). Insiders use
their market power to exercise upward pressure on their wages and thereby generating
unemployment. According to this view, the higher the …ring costs, the higher the unem-
ployment.
A completely di¤erent view of …ring costs is the one by Lazear (1990). He shows that
if markets are perfect and complete, then ‡exible wages can undo all the e¤ects of …ring
costs and, therefore, …ring costs are neutral on employment. Workers pay ex-ante a fee
which is equal to the severance payment they get in case they are …red. If they keep the
job, they get their fee back with higher wages. In such a world, for any level of …ring costs,
it is always possible to write an optimal contract that undoes all the e¤ects of severance
payments.
A third view of …ring costs highlights the possibility of …ring costs arising endogenously.
This approach is motivated by the fact that sometimes …rms and workers negotiate sever-
ance payments which do not coincide with the ones legally set; or even, some …rms o¤er
severance payments in the absence of employment protection legislation. Several authors
have investigated this idea in di¤erent contexts. For instance, Booth and Chatterji (1989)
construct a model of …rm-speci…c training where the returns to training are uncertain as
well as the outside options for workers. In such a context, the costs of training are shared
between the …rm and the worker because there exists the possibility that workers quit. In
case of being dismissed, workers are compensated by this cost with a redundancy payment.
Also, Booth (1997) argues that in a two-period model, where it is in the interest of …rms
1The …rm has to compensate the worker when facing a redundancy while no compensation is required
in a disciplinary dismissal.
1to have long-term employment relationships, if workers are risk-averse they prefer a con-
tract with redundancy payment, and risk-neutral …rms …nd it optimal to o¤er it. Finally,
Saint-Paul (1996) explores how …ring costs arise endogenously in a dynamic e¢ciency wage
model. Firms may chose to voluntarily o¤er …ring costs in their labour contracts because
these help …rms to credibly commit to more stable employment policies in an uncertain
environment.
These three views exposed above have radically di¤erent ideas of …ring costs. One
could summarise crudely that …ring costs are “bad” according to the …rst view, “neutral”
according to the second view or even “good” according to the third view since they can
be an optimal instrument for …rms. Consequently, these three frameworks summarise all
possible e¤ects of …ring costs over employment. The model presented here is an e¢ciency
wage model where dismissal con‡icts are costly. As it will be seen, modelling …ring costs
in this way allows to integrate the three di¤erent views mentioned above.
Most of the existing work on …ring costs focuses on labour demand models and the
only type of dismissals considered are redundancies2. These models are very useful for
understanding the e¤ects of …ring costs on the dynamic functioning of the labour market.
However, the e¤ects on aggregate employment are ambiguous and remain in partial equi-
librium. The implicit assumption of labour demand models is that wages are exogenous
and do not change in the presence of …ring costs3. In our model, wages are endogenous
and …ring exogenous. In this way, the model highlights another dimension of …ring costs
which is not captured by labour demand models. To focus on the e¤ects of …ring costs
on the wage-setting is particularly important for those unemployment models in which in
the long-run the unemployment rate is determined entirely by long-run supply factors (see
Layard et al. (1991)).
There is a commonly held idea that …ring costs are high because dismissal con‡icts
involve large administrative and legal costs and that these lead to higher labour costs.
Although this point is often made, it is usually modeled in a simplistic way: …ring costs
paid by …rms are assumed to be higher than the indemnity that …rms have to pay to
workers4. But this is not actually the case in most European countries. Instead, the source
of higher …ring costs has to do more with the fact that the legislation generally sets a higher
severance pay for cases taken to court and declared “unfair” than for those considered
“fair” by court. These terms are de…ned from the worker’s perspective. An “unfair” case
is when the court considers that the …rm is wrong and therefore the worker must receive
the (“unfair”) …ring cost because it is an unjust dismissal. The “fair” severance payment
is the default indemnity for a dismissal. When a case is taken to court and is declared
“fair”, the court considers that the …rm is right and the worker simply receives the default
2See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), Bertola (1990 and
1992) and Nickell (1978).
3An exemption of this is Bertola (1990).
4See Burda (1992) for a model of this sort.
2indemnity. For instance, in Spain5, the cost of a redundancy declared “fair” is 20 days’
wages per each year worked with a maximum of 12 months’ wages. But if the case is
declared “unfair”, the cost is more than double, 45 days’ wages per year worked with a
maximum of 42 months. This “unfair” rate also applies to disciplinary cases6.
In this paper, we explicitly model dismissal con‡icts and derive their cost. Con‡icts
between employers and employees can arise for very di¤erent reasons. In general, when-
ever …rms face a redundancy, they want to use disciplinary dismissals in order to avoid
paying …ring costs. We model …ring costs in a context where worker e¤ort is not perfectly
observable. This actually provides a rationale for the existence of workers’ right to sue
their employers in case of disagreement. In such a context, workers can be in a weaker
position because …rms can get away with the use of disciplinary dismissals whenever they
need to adjust their workforce (i.e. in case of redundancy). Therefore, there is a reason
for job protection legislation to include the right for employees to take cases to court. The
drawback is that workers will then tend to deny any disciplinary case to get a compensation
(specially if the indemnity is higher when the case is declared “unfair”), again, because of
the di¢culty in observing worker e¤ort. As it will be discussed, a double moral hazard
problem could arise. Our claim in this paper is that the resolution of this problem by a
third party will be imperfect given the information problem.
The existence of imperfect resolutions of dismissal cases will in turn imply that discipli-
nary dismissals will not be costless and …ring costs will have a negative e¤ect on aggregate
employment. As it will be discussed at the end of the paper, the solution does not neces-
sarily imply the elimination of …ring costs. Rather, what will appear to be important is
the gap between the severance payment for cases considered “unfair” and those “fair”.
We concentrate on dismissal con‡icts of small/medium …rms for which “individual”
dismissal regulation applies. In case of large …rms, redundancies are generally under the
“collective” dismissal regulation which implies that the number of redundancies and their
total cost are bargained with a third party (generally, unions)7.
In our model, …rms will bear a …ring cost that is exactly the same as the indemnity
received by the worker. As mentioned, this is the case for most European countries. In
countries in which the administrative approval processes are very complex8, many of the
cases are settled by the worker and the …rm out of court, precisely to avoid these costs.
Therefore, again, …rms do not bear a higher cost than the indemnity received by workers.
The worker receives a settlement which amount lies between the legal severance payment
and the (expected) cost had the case gone to court. In this sense, the …ring costs due
5See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1999) for a comparison of these indemnities in di¤erent
OECD countries.
6In this case, the di¤erence in costs of between a “unfair” and a “fair” case is extreme: 45 days’ wages
per year worked if “unfair” versus no compensation if “fair”.
7See Booth (1996 and 1997) for a model of …ring costs in unionised sectors of the economy.
8Typically, this is case in southern European countries (see Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1999)
for several indicators of the “strictness” of employment protection legislation).
3to dismissal con‡icts that are derived in the present model can be thought as the upper
bound of what a worker could receive from bargaining with the …rm.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, …ring costs are described, and their
implications for (e¢ciency) wages and employment are derived. In the last section, we
discuss some policy implications.
2 The model
The model is a version of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) with …ring
costs. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz, a worker’s e¤ort is not perfectly observable and there
is a detection technology that catches shirking workers (never erroneously) with some
probability q (where q < 1). When a worker is found shirking, he is …red and becomes
unemployed. Workers also have an exogenous probability, b; of being separated from their
job for redundancy reasons9. In the next section we describe how …ring costs are modeled.
2.1 Redundancies and disciplinary dismissals in con‡ict
Most industrialised countries have a job protection legislation framework that protects
workers against redundancies. The idea is that a redundancy is an exogenous event to the
worker and imposes a cost to him and thus he must be compensated for it. At the same
time, employers are allowed to …re workers for disciplinary reasons without having to pay
any compensation.
A framework where worker’s e¤ort is imperfectly observable is best suited for consider-
ing another common feature of job protection legislation, namely the right for workers to
sue employers in case of disagreement.
Whenever …rms need to adjust their workforce, they want to use disciplinary dismissals
to avoid paying …ring costs. And the di¢culty in observing worker e¤ort means there is
some chance that …rms can get away with such strategy10. The right for workers to sue
employers in case of disagreement cancompensate for this imperfection. But then, similarly
to …rms, workers will deny any reasons for disciplinary dismissal to get a compensation
based on unjust grounds. In such a context, both true disciplinary cases and hidden
redundancies arrive to court as disciplinary cases. Court’s decisions are based on whatever
evidence (if any) is presented by the agents, which is not perfectly correlated with reality
given the information problem. So, in general, courts are not able to perfectly distinguish
between true disciplinary cases and hidden redundancies. Thus, the resolution by a third
party will tend to be imperfect given the information problem.
9The terms adverse economic shocks and redundancies are used interchangeably here.
10Malo (1998) considers the case where …rms use disciplinary dismissals in cases of redundancies in a
model where …ring costs are bargained in the shadow of the law between employer and employee.
4In the model, this is represented by the fact that some (true) disciplinary dismissal cases
could be mistakenly considered in favour of the worker (i.e. “unfair”) and some hidden
redundancies could be mistakenly declared in favour of the …rm (i.e. “fair”) by court. In
other words, in the …rst case, workers are compensated when they should not. And in the
second case, …rms avoid paying …ring costs when they should have paid them.
We de…ne m as the probability that a (true) disciplinary dismissal is mistakenly declared
“unfair”, where m > 0 given the information problem. That is, with probability m,
disciplinary cases cost the “unfair” rate because they are declared in favour of the worker.
Only with probability (1¡m) there is no court mistake and disciplinary cases are costless
to the …rm.
We de…ne z as the probability that a (hidden) redundancy is declared “unfair”, where
z < 1 given the information problem. That is, with probability (1 ¡ z), there is a court
mistake and redundancies are costless to the …rm. Only with probability z, the worker is
compensated for a redundancy case.
Firms can better prove that a (true) disciplinary dismissal is indeed disciplinary than
to prove that a redundancy is a disciplinary case. That is, the probability that a dismissal
taken to court is costless to the …rm is higher when it is a (true) disciplinary dismissal than
when it is a (hidden) redundancy, or that z ¸ m: In other words, the probability that the
case is declared in favour of the worker is lower when the case is a (true) disciplinary case.
We assume that the legislation …xes a severance payment of c for redundancies and
a severance payment of C if the case is taken to court and is declared “unfair”, where
c · C. Then, given the double moral hazard problem, the …rm’s expected …ring cost of
a (true) disciplinary dismissal is mC and of a (hidden) redundancy is zC. Table 1 below
summarises …ring costs described11.
Table 1: Firing costs for redundancies and disciplinary cases
Reality Declaration Expected Cost
of …rm of worker for …rm
Redundancy Redundancy accepts c
Redundancy Disciplinary denies zC
Disciplinary Disciplinary denies mC
To sum up, given the context described above, there is always an incentive for …rms
to declare redundancies as disciplinary cases and for the worker to deny any disciplinary
case. A further discussion of this double moral hazard problem is done in the last section
of the paper.
11Let’s assume that in case of redundancies presented as disciplinary cases, the …rm can never show
evidence of the case and the cost is zC. In the case of real disciplinary cases, if the …rm is able to proof
the case with probability k; then the cost is mC where mC ´ 0(1 ¡k) +kzC. Thus z ¸ m:
52.2 Non-shirking condition
In this section, we analyse the wage workers must be paid in order that they expend the
optimal e¤ort on the job. Workers are risk neutral12. Their instantaneous utility function
is: U(w;e) = w ¡ e; where w is the wage and e is the e¤ort. Workers e¤ort choices are
discrete. If they shirk, they expend zero e¤ort and production is zero. The e¤ort required
to perform in the job is e > 0.
Workers choose the level of e¤ort that maximises their utility actualised at rate r. By
V i
E; we denote the present discounted utility of an employed worker when shirking (i=S) or
non shirking (i=N). Firms want to o¤er a contract such that workers expend the optimal
e¤ort. In what follows, the condition under which a worker will choose not to shirk is
studied (the non-shirking condition, NSC).
When a worker does not shirk, he gets a utility equal to:
rV
N
E = w ¡ e + b(VU + zC ¡ V
N
E ) (1)
while if the worker decides to shirk his utility is:
rV
S
E = w + b(VU + zC ¡ V
S
E ) + q(VU + mC ¡ V
S
E ) (2)
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), shirking saves the current disutility of e¤ort but it
implies a higher risk of becoming unemployed. This risk is proportional to the probability
of being caught shirking (q). Firing costs also in‡uence the e¤ort decision here because of
the imperfect court decisions. With probability m; shirking workers may be compensated
with a severance payment. This reduces the cost of shirking.
The worker will choose to provide an e¤ort e; if and only if V N
E ¸ V S
E . We can write
this condition using equations (1) and (2) and get the NSC in form of utilities:
V
S
E ¡ VU ¸
e
q
+ mC ´ K (3)
This condition states that in order to provide incentives, the punishment of losing a
job must be at least equal to the opportunity cost of shirking, denoted by K. Substituting
this condition in equation (1), we get the incentive compatible wage:
w ¸ e ¡ bzC + rVu + K(r + b) ´ b w (4)
In this wage equation, we can distinguish between the reservation wage (…rst three
terms) and the rent linked to the incentive problem (last term). For C = 0, this condition
is the same as in the original Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In order to provide incentives,
wages need to exceed the reservation wage by a rent, K: This rent is proportional to the
opportunity cost of not shirking weighted by the term (r + b). The higher the discount
rate, the more a worker values the saving of e¤ort today. The higher the probability of
12For a model of …ring costs where workers are risk averse, see Booth (1997).
6being …red for other reasons than (truly) shirking cases (i.e. shocks), the more costly it is
to expend e¤ort today.
For C > 0, we can distinguish two types of e¤ects of …ring costs: those directly related
with the incentive problem and those that are not. Firing costs a¤ect the incentive problem
because to the extent that (truly) disciplinary dismissals are declared“unfair” (i.e., m > 0),
legal severance payments reduce the punishment associated with being …red when caught
shirking. This implies that …rms have to pay higher rents in order to prevent shirking, as
can be seen in the above non-shirking condition (see equation (3)). This e¤ect of …ring
costs has the same ‡avour as that in the insider-outsider theory, where …ring costs increase
market power of incumbent workers.
At the same time, independently of the incentive problem, the introductionof mandated
severance payments allows the employer to reduce the wage exactly by the same proportion
that the present discounted utility of an employee is increased, without a¤ecting incentives.
This can be seen in the …ring cost element of the reservation wage (see equation (4)). The
idea is that lower wages today, together with compensation when being …red for shocks,
leave the present discounted utility of being employed unchanged. This e¤ect of …ring costs
is the same as that proposed by Lazear (1990)13.
Although this last mechanism is not directly related with the incentive problem, it has
very interesting links with e¢ciency wages in models in which …ring is not exogenous. As
mentioned, in the standard e¢ciency wage model without severance payments, workers
are paid a “…ring premium” in order to prevent shirking because expending e¤ort is more
costly the higher the probability of being …red due to adverse economic shocks. When a
severance payment is imposed, …rms face two opposite e¤ects in the presence of shocks:
they have to pay an implicit …ring cost to avoid shirking (the “…ring premium”), but
they can lower wages because workers are being compensated when …red after a shock14.
An important further insight is made by Saint-Paul (1996): in a dynamic e¢ciency wage
model, it is in the interest of …rms to voluntarily include a severance pay in the labour
contract that they o¤er. This is one possible way for the …rm to credibly commit to have
a more stable employment policy when facing shocks, which then allows the …rm to reduce
directly the “…ring premium” to be paid. The optimal severance payment is such that the
“…ring premium” of the e¢ciency wage is completely compensated. In the present model,
the imperfect court resolutions imply that …rms do not want to o¤er severance payments
to workers15.
13So, for m = 0, the two models have the same predictions (see section (2.4) where the market equilibrium
is solved).
14See Katsimi (1998) for a more detailed derivation of this mechanism in a fully stochastic e¢ciency
wage model.
15If m = 0, …rms would o¤er …ring costs in the present model. In the case of m = 0, for C = e=q the two
models would coincide. Still, in the present model, severance payments are set legally while in Saint-Paul
they are endogenous. See Booth (1997) for a discussion where the level of mandated …ring costs may di¤er
from those bargained.
7Back to the Non-Shirking Condition, if a contract satis…es the NSC, that is, if the
worker is paid at least b w or, if being unemployed is a su¢ciently large punishment (V S
E >
VU), the worker will choose to expend the e¤ort e. We de…ne VE as the expected utility in
equilibrium. The …rm chooses the minimum wage at which the worker will not shirk, so
that in equilibrium the NSC is binding and VE = V N
E = V S
E :
2.3 Hiring decisions
All …rms in the model are identical and in…nitely lived. They chose employment so as to
maximise the expected present value of pro…ts discounted at rate r. We denote by ¦ the
present discounted value of marginal pro…ts. We have:
r¦ = f
0(L) ¡ w ¡ b(zC + ¦)
where f(L) is the production function with f0(L) > 0 and f00(L) < 0:
In the presence of …ring costs, the marginal cost of hiring a worker is given by the wage
plus the future expected cost of being …red. There is no cost of posting vacancies, so …rms
hire workers to the point where the marginal pro…t is zero, i.e. ¦ = 0. Labour demand in
steady state is given by:
f
0(L) = w + bzC (5)
This equation shows that, for given wages, …ring costs reduce labour demand propor-
tionally to their expected present value.
2.4 Market equilibrium
Equilibrium occurs when each …rm, taking as given all other …rms’ wages and employment,
…nds it optimal to o¤er the going wage rather than a di¤erent wage. The key market
variable that determines …rm individual behaviour is the present value of the utility of an
unemployed worker, VU. Let a be the rate of exit from unemployment. To simplify, we
suppose that unemployment bene…ts are zero.
We have:
rVU = a(VE ¡ VU)
Given that the NSC is satis…ed, we have that in equilibrium:
rVU = aK (6)
Now, substituting equation (6) in equation (4), we get the e¢ciency wage curve in
equilibrium:
8b w = e ¡ bzC + K(r + b + a) (7)
In equilibrium, the incentive compatible wage is higher the higher the exit rate from un-
employment. This result is also found in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The rent linked with
the incentive problem is weighted by a because the higher a; the less becoming unemployed
is a penalty.
We derive employment, L, from the steady state ‡ows condition: in steady state in‡ows
to unemployment are given by bL. Out‡ows are given by a(N ¡ L), where N is the total
of workers in the economy. Thus,





Combining equations (5) and (7), we get that the equilibrium out‡ow rate of unem-
ployment, a¤, is given by:
f
0(L) = e ¡ bzC + K(r + b + a
¤) + bzC (9)
In equation (9), it can be seen that the second type of e¤ect of severance payments
mentioned before can be fully undone: the second and the fourth element of this equation
cancel out. The idea is that if markets are complete and perfect, and …ring costs are fully
transferred to workers, then they are neutral on employment because the wage is reduced
by the same proportion as the increased shadow cost of labour (see Lazear (1990)).
However, in this model, even if …ring costs are fully received by workers, they are not
neutral because they a¤ect the rent, K. The e¤ects of severance payments on the e¢ciency
wage setting have no counteracting e¤ects through the non-wage component of the shadow
cost of labour. Therefore, the wage schedule is shifted to the left and it has a negative
impact e¤ect on employment. It is interesting to note that even if the wage is set by the
…rm, it is not possible to fully endogenize the severance payments in the workers’ wage.
As mentioned, this result is due to the presence of a double moral hazard problem that
can only be resolved imperfectly by a third party. This implies that …ring costs have a real
e¤ect because they reduce the cost of shirking.
The aggregate NSC can also be written in terms of the unemployment rate, u. Re-
placing equation (8) into equation (7), we get:






= e ¡ bzC + K [r + b=u]
where u = (N ¡ L)=N .
This expression can be represented in the (w; L) space. Figure 1 shows the labour
market e¤ects of neutral and non-neutral …ring costs. The case where …ring costs are
neutral corresponds to the case where there is not such a double moral hazard problem16.











Figure 1: Market equilibrium with neutral and non-neutral …ring costs
16In such a case, disciplinary dismissals have zero cost and therefore they do not a¤ect the rent to be
paid to workers. Consequently, …ring costs are neutral on employment.
102.5 Policy implications
In the model presented above, the existence of job protection legislation in a context in
which worker e¤ort is not perfectly observable implied that …ring costs had a negative
e¤ect on employment. As explained, the problem in such a system is that there is always
an incentive for con‡ict between employer and employee, i.e. for the employer to claim
any dismissal to be disciplinary and for the worker to deny any disciplinary case. This, in
turn, implies imperfect resolutions by third parties. The goal of this section is to discuss
some possible policy implications derived from the model above.
The mechanism that generates such double moral hazard problem is that, for …rms, the
expected cost of a redundancy is higher than the expected cost of declaring it a disciplinary
dismissal. And in turn, for workers, the expected bene…t of denying a disciplinary dismissal
becomes positive. Following the model presented above (see Table 1), when …rms declare
redundancies as disciplinary cases and workers deny all disciplinary cases, the court is not
able to perfectly detect all the true disciplinary cases. The court is able to catch a hidden
redundancy only with probability z. And it is able to discover true disciplinary cases only
with probability (1 ¡ m). Therefore, …rms …nd it worth it to declare disciplinary cases
when facing redundancies if:
c ¸ zC (10)
If …rms misuse disciplinary cases, then workers have an incentive to deny any of them
because:
mC ¸ 0 (11)
If these two conditions are met, then the double moral hazard is an equilibrium. That
is, all dismissals are taken to court as disciplinary cases. As shown in the previous section,
in such a case, …ring costs are not neutral on employment. As can be seen from conditions
(10) and (11), policies that concentrate on undoing the double moral hazard problem do
not necessarily imply the complete removal of severance payments.
As mentioned, in general, most employment protection legislation systems set higher
severance payments for cases being declared “unfair” than for those considered “fair”.
The idea behind this goes in the right direction in the sense that it tries to punish for
unjust dismissals. For large enough C, the incentive of …rms to cheat could be undone (see
equation (10)) and therefore, there would be no double moral hazard17. In such a case, high
severance payments for “unfair” dismissals have a punishment role for …rms who would
use disciplinary dismissals when facing a redundancy. However, such a policy may not be
su¢cient. If C fails to be high enough, it motivates cheating from both agents which in
turn generates imperfect court decisions. And the resulting average cost of …ring is higher
17If the …rm does not cheat, then the worker does not cheat either since such strategy would be self-
revealing.
11because some dismissals are paid at the “unfair” rate. Moreover, this does not seem to be
the most e¢cient policy since it does not have any punishment role for the worker when
he denies true disciplinary cases.
A more e¢cient policy would be one that punishes any agent found lying. That is, on
the one hand, to set a severance payment that …rms have to pay, CF, when the court catches
a hidden redundancy. On the other hand, to set a penalty for workers, Cw, whenever caught
denying a true disciplinary dismissal. Table 2 summarises the expected costs of …ring for
the …rm and worker under such policy proposal.
Table 2: Firing costs: a policy proposal
Reality Declaration Expected Cost
of …rm of worker for …rm for worker
Redundancy Redundancy accepts c
Redundancy Disciplinary denies zCF
Disciplinary Disciplinary denies mCw
Under such a policy, taking m and z as given, truth-telling of both agents is an equi-
librium if the following two conditions are satis…ed:
c ¡ zCF · 0
and
¡mCw · 0
Note that for any given m and z; a high enough gap between severance payments for
cases declared “unfair” and cases declared “fair”, that is for a large CF ¡ c, and for any
positive penalty to the worker, that is Cw, the above conditions would hold.
This policy highlights that for anemployment protectionsystemto work, specially when
worker e¤ort is not observable, two things are important. First, the di¤erence between the
level of …ring costs set for cases declared “unfair” and “fair” has to be high enough. Second,
di¤erent indemnities should be set for “unfair” cases depending on whether it is considered
that it is the worker’s or the …rm’s initiative.
3 Conclusion
Firing costs are often blamed for depressing employment levels. But there are very di¤erent
views of …ring costs among economists: some models indeed predict that …ring costs reduce
employment while in other contexts …ring costs have no e¤ect on employment. Also,
12in some other environments, …ring costs are actually instruments chosen voluntarily by
…rms. In this paper, we have proposed a model that stresses that it is not just the level
of severance payments what matters, but a wider view of employment protection. In
particular, dismissal con‡icts and their cost have been considered. As discussed before,
the model presented integrates the di¤erent existing views of …ring costs.
More precisely, we have analysed the problem behind the con‡ict between employer and
employee in cases of disciplinary dismissals and redundancies, in a context where e¤ort is
imperfectly observable. There is a double moral hazard problem that can only be resolved
imperfectly by a third party. The conclusion is that …ring costs would have a negative e¤ect
on employment because they modify the rent to be paid to workers in order to prevent
those workers from shirking.
The main policy conclusions are two. First, to set a gap wide enough between severance
payments for cases declared “unfair” and cases declared “fair”. Second, any agent caught
lying should be punished. In our model, di¤erent severance payments should be set for
hidden redundancies declared “unfair” and for truly disciplinary cases declared “unfair”.
With such a policy, the di¤erent …ring costs for “unfair” dismissals have a punishment role
for both employer and employee and, therefore, its implementation would eliminate the
double moral hazard problem.
In this paper we have explored one possible reason behind imperfect court resolu-
tions and their implication for employment. That is, the fact that e¤ort, which motivates
disciplinary dismissals, is not perfectly observable. There are other reasons why court’s
decisions could be imperfect. In our context, there is the problem of de…ning a dismissal
case precisely. For instance, in the case of redundancies, it is di¢cult to set unquestionably
“how bad” the economic situation of a …rm must be in order to have an objective reason
to …re a worker. Similarly, for disciplinary dismissals, it is di¢cult to set the degree of the
worker’s fault that justi…es dismissal. This leaves room for interpretation implying again
that resolutions will tend to be imperfect. Other possible reasons are related with what the
legislation considers as an “unfair” dismissal itself, something that di¤ers across countries
(see OECD (1999)). Or, how complex the dismissal procedures are because this implies
potentially more strict proofs in order to win a case. In Galdón and Güell (1999), we in-
corporate these elements in a theoretical model and undertake an empirical analysis to test
the magnitude of dismissal con‡icts and labour market outcomes for di¤erent countries.
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